Dialogue with Cuba

An upcoming book by Peter Kornbluh and William LeoGrande examines efforts by prior U.S. Administrations to secretly establish a formal dialogue with Cuba. “Talking With Fidel: The Untold Story of Dialogue Between the United States and Cuba,” will focus on declassified memos and letters, some of which are now available at the National Security Archive web site.

While some (think of Don Quixote and his faithful companion Sancho Panza) continue to insist on a policy of hostility against the so-called “Generals of the July 26 Movement,” the forward motion of peace and co-existence that should exist between the two nations is clearly on the rise. It seems that whenever Americans encounter their colonial attitude towards Cuba and Latin America (which isn’t often enough) they don’t like how history portrays them. Now the possibility of doing the right thing arises, and we must encourage our new president to take the proper steps.

A memo written over thirty years ago (1975), by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin America Harry Shlaudeman to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, outlines a basic map for peace, suggesting that “we reestablish diplomatic and consular relations as part of an initial bargain including a partial lifting of the ‘blockade’ and mutual commitments on non-intervention and negotiations to settle claims.”

The trend in U.S. demands of Cuba has been for the island to make a series of concessions and agreements which include removing the Castro brothers, after which we would grant diplomatic relations.

The memo clearly shows that this was not the trend for similar negotiations involving Czechoslovakia and East Germany. It also states that “the U.S. would agree to discuss the status of Guantánamo at some time in the future.”

Guantánamo came under U.S. control at the beginning of the Spanish-American War in 1898, and became an official Navy base after a deal with the first U.S.-approved Cuban government in 1903. With all the current talk of “closing Guantánamo,” we should also be talking about “getting out of Guantánamo” altogether. Elsewhere in the memo, Shlaudeman asserts that “the base is now more of a burden than a blessing to the Navy.” Under President Bush, Guantánamo became a living symbol of all the things modern man would rather forget about his colonial past.

Now that we’ve endured and seen the end of what was possibly the worst presidency in modern times, it’s time to put our colonial inclinations to rest and take a growthful step forward.

Imagine all the people sharing all the world.

A Glimpse of Hope

I was sitting at my desk, enjoying my numerous privileges as a North American citizen who’s already determined that Barack Obama is the only sane choice for the future and wondering about what to do for lunch when a friend dropped the summer 2008 issue of Glimpse on my desk. “There’s something about Cuba,” she said, referring to the magazine.

Having been busy formalizing my education over the past year-point-five (first at the California Institute of Integral Studies, and now at the Colorado Technical University Online), I hadn’t thought much about Cuba, focusing instead on my internal plans and desires for world domination.

But there it was, sitting on my desk, partly covering the recent book by Riane Eisler (The Real Wealth of Nations), which I doubt would be on John McCain’s and Sarah Wink Wink Palin’s reading list (though I wish it was). So I explored the magazine with my chef salad and diet coke and took part in a wonderfully unexpected look at modern Cuba.

The article began with a mild historical perspective; “Cuba and the United States have not always been the friendliest of neighbors—to put it mildly.” Perhaps a bit too mild. You might say that the U.S. has wanted to control Cuba since the early 1820s… or that the U.S. has opposed every effort for Cuban independence since 1868, or that we continue to support Cuban-American terrorists who don’t mind killing Cubans. But in today’s political climate it makes sense to start things mildly.

There doesn’t seem to be a way to tell American people about the history between their big country and the small island without putting things mildly, as the truth will simply drive many to their corporate media viewing stations.

Glimpse magazine’s section on Cuba doesn’t try to hit you over the head with facts… it gives you a gentle nudge while pointing to a serious flaw in our foreign policy. An American tourist is quoted: “President Bush is hated by Cubans, but American citizens are very well-received. Most Cubans have no trouble separating our people from our government.” If only pro-embargo Americans and Cuban-Americans could take that same view of Cuba, we would not be punishing the people of the island because we don’t like their government. Maybe they’re just more civilized than we are.

The youngest and wisest person that I know once said that Cuba-policy seems to be run by spoiled children from a wealthy family… children that won’t ever have to worry about getting a scholarship for school, or even completing their required course work in order to graduate.

Peace.

After He's Gone

When Castro dies, having outlived 11 U.S. presidents, an untold number of assassination attempts (from both the U.S. government and militant exiles) and a 45-plus-years embargo by the largest, strongest country in the world, his status will be forever solidified as a world-wide leader who stood for the little guy until the end. This may not be accurate, but it is what the world will remember.

Our best chance is to make peace with Cuba while he’s still around; to make peace “in spite of him still being there” not because “he’s no longer around.” This “peace” should be our defining quality, not the insistence on political elites to treat Cuba like a “must win” football game. This will show the world today and future generations that, in spite of history, our heart is in the right place.

This is the America that I love—based on the rights of people, not the right of faceless corporate bullies and old world colonialists. We still have a choice. Whatever reason we find to make peace, the embargo should never reach the age of fifty.

Peace.

The Three Manolos

Once upon a Cuban history lived three men with the same first name but different points of view.

They were born at a time when their island was still the subject of some controversy among the new and aging empires of the world, but at one time, as children, they were each called “Manolo,” or “Manolito” by those who loved them and had access to their youthful energy.

The three young Manolos had dreams and hopes for what would be their adult lives; one of them wanted to be a doctor and cure the sick; another wanted to build skyscrapers and airports; the other wanted to fly airplanes and see the world from above the clouds.

In time, the three grew from the “Manolo” or “Manolito” stage to the respectable “Manuel,” in which life is serious and dreams have to be evaluated against reality.

As life would have it, the three Manuels (Manuel-3) had something else in common. At a time when they might have been living out their dreams, their country called upon them. It was a loud call, and Manuel-3 responded.

In the end, all things being equal, Manuel-3 didn’t find it easy to get along with its highly individualistic fractions, and that hurt their nationalistic efforts.

Artíme, Varona and Ray, traded their personal dreams for the collective dream that is Cuba. And while this humble story teller does not condone all the values they were forced to adopt from their imperial allies, we salute their bravery and appreciate their commitment and motivation.

Long Live The Three Manolos.

Paz.

Schlesinger to Kennedy: Chill Out, Dude! Part 4 (of 4)

Arthur Schlesinger was a noted historian and a scholar. His book on the Kennedy years, “A Thousand Days,” was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for Biography in 1966. That was his second Pulitzer, having received the first one 20 years earlier for “The Age of Jackson.”

No doubt he taught his children to “tell the truth” and “treat your neighbors well” and “do onto others” and all that other stuff that he had to set aside when he went to work for the Kennedy Administration.

There’s no indication that I’m aware of to suggest that Schlesinger participated in the post-Bay of Pigs plans of murder and sabotage known as Operation Mongoose, but much of this information is still classified, and perhaps “too grown up” for us “children” to consume with any level of sympathetic appreciation.

“Kennedy would hardly have initiated the project himself,” Schlesinger wrote of Bay of Pigs in the Boston Globe on April 17, 2001, 40 years after the invasion (although Kennedy did initiate Operation Mongoose). “Allen W. Dulles, the head of the CIA, detecting limited enthusiasm on Kennedy’s part, told the new president not to worry. He assured Kennedy that the invasion would set off uprisings behind the line and defections from Castro’s militia, and that if things went badly, the invaders could easily join anti-Castro guerrilla bands in the Escambray Mountains.”

I appreciate his loyalty to JFK, but it seems a bit “old world” to blame the CIA for what was, essentially, a presidential decision. Kennedy was a sophisticated and intelligent man (this was no G.W. Jr. playing war with his father’s empire) and should have known better.

“The Bay of Pigs was indeed a perfect failure,” wrote Schlesinger. “But for Kennedy it was also an effective, if expensive, education.” (Isn’t it nice when Presidents can learn from their mistakes?) But then Schlesinger returns to blaming the CIA. “Like intelligence agencies the world over, the CIA believed it knew the requirements of national security better than transient elected officials like presidents, and it invoked the excuse of ‘plausible deniability’ to act as it deemed best without informing those to whom the agency was nominally accountable.”

Saddest of all is that we seem to agree that this is how our government will work. There’s just nothing we can do about it, in spite of telling ourselves and others that we’re “citizens,” not “subjects…” and that we tell the government what we want, not the other way around.

Peace.

Schlesinger to Kennedy: Chill Out, Dude! Part 3 (of 4)

In the memo of April 10, 1961 (“Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume X, Cuba, 1961-1963” Doc No. 86, Page 196) Arthur Schlesinger, Special Assistant to the President, offers John Fitzgerald Kennedy tips on lying: “When lies must be told, they should be told by subordinate officials. At no point should the President be asked to lend himself to the cover operation. For this reason, there seems to be merit in Secretary Rusk’s suggestion that someone other than the President make the final decision and to do so in his absence—someone whose head can later be placed on the block if things go terribly wrong.” [This principle is still applicable in the 21^st Century, but Schlesinger ignores the fact that the sacrificial lamb can later be granted a presidential pardon.]

The memo provides sample “prepped answers” to potential media questions. But why not just blame the CIA? “We will have to be prepared to show” he wrote, “that the alleged CIA personnel were errant idealists or soldiers-of-fortune working on their own.”

After the embarrassment at Bay of Pigs, the CIA absorbed much of the blame. (Forty-some years later, they again took the blame for a different President’s decision to go to war.)

Upon returning home (on May 3, 1961) from a two-week trip to Western Europe, Schlesinger wrote Kennedy another memo about “Reactions to Cuba in Western Europe.” What he found was “a hunger for a rational explanation of the Cuban operation.” He said that “the available stories had left most people baffled and incredulous.”

Over the long term, he said, “I think we have suffered a serious but by no means fatal loss of confidence in our intelligence and responsibility. This can be easily recouped if we seem to return to more intelligent and responsible ways in the future.” [This reminds me of the “clearer heads will prevail” comment in the film Thirteen Days. Schlesinger seems to be pointing out that this is the time for clearer heads.]

The invasion, he sums up, “is greatly feared as forecasting future directions of U.S. policy.”

That fear was prophetic. The first thing the Kennedy administration did after Bay of Pigs was to implement Operation Mongoose, with Bobby Kennedy as designated bulldog in charge. This is where the wacky assassination schemes rose to a new level [although many sound like rejects from Warner Brothers Studios’ series of adventure shorts starring the Road Runner & the silent and inward Wyle E. Coyote].

The question remains, would the Cubans have felt the need for Soviet missiles had Operation Mongoose not been implemented? In an interview that ran in the Miami Herald on October 20, 2002, Schlesinger referred to the operation as “silly and stupid,” giving the Cuban government “a legitimate fear of an American Invasion.”

Peace.

Schlesinger to Kennedy: Chill Out, Dude! Part 2 (of 4)

On April 5, 1961, ten days before the bombings that launched the Bay of Pigs operation, Special Assistant to the President, Arthur Schlesinger, wrote in a memo (“Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume X, Cuba, 1961-1963” Doc No. 81, Page 186) to President John F. Kennedy that “I am in favor of a continuation and expansion of the present approach to Cuba—i.e., quiet infiltration of anti-Castro exiles into Cuba and subsequent support through air drops.” But he adds in the same paragraph, that “in present circumstances the operation seems to me to involve many hazards; and on balance—and despite the intelligence and responsibility with which the case for the action has been presented—I am against it.”

Further down he says it “will seem increasingly intolerable to subject ourselves to the humiliation of a defeat in Cuba.”

Regarding the political fallout from the invasion, win or loose, Schlesinger’s memo identifies three options: evade the questions, deny involvement, or declare ignorance. His 3 choices can be boiled down to 2 courses of action: say nothing, or lie through your teeth—this last one being a presidential favorite, as well-crafted lies get better mileage.

Five days later, on April 10, Schlesinger penned another memo (“Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume X, Cuba, 1961-1963,” Doc No. 86, Page 196) to President Kennedy. The subject was “Cuba: Political, Diplomatic and Economic Problems.”

Section 2 of this memo is quoted in full:

“2. What is at stake. In the days since January 20, your administration has changed the face of American foreign policy. The soberness of style, the absence of cold war clichés, the lack of self-righteous and sermonizing, the impressive combination of reasonableness and firmness, the generosity to new ideas, the dedication to social progress, the tough-minded idealism of purpose—all these factors have transformed (to use that repellent word) the ‘image’ of the United States before the world. The result has been to go far toward restoring confidence in the intelligence, maturity and restraint of American leadership. People around the world have forgotten the muddling and moralizing conservation of the Eisenhower period with surprising speed. The United States is emerging again as a great, mature and liberal nation, coolly and intelligently dedicated to the job of stopping Communism, strengthening the free and neutral nations and working for peace. It is this reawakening world faith in America which is at stake in the Cuban operation.”

Later he adds one of the most honest statements you’ll find in the volumes of meetings and plans and memos and briefings: “A great many people simply do not at this moment see that Cuba presents so grave and compelling a threat to our national security as to justify a course of action which much of the world will interpret as calculated aggression against a small nation in defiance both of treaty obligations and of the international standards we have repeatedly asserted against the Communist world.” Here Schlesinger makes a good point that is even more relevant today.

Next: How to lie to the nation and blame it on the CIA.

Peace.